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Abstract
In 1995, Aumann proved that in games of perfect information, common knowledge
of rationality yields backward induction. In 1998, Stalnaker provided an example of
a game in which common knowledge of rationality, once belief revision is taken into
account, does not yield backward induction. However, in some pertinent situations
in this example, players are allowed to forfeit the rationality condition. We introduce
the notion of robust knowledge which extends common knowledge to all relevant
situations, including counterfactual ones. Robust knowledge of rationality, in a general
belief revision setting, represents the “no irrationality in the system” condition which
is at the heart of the backward induction argument. We show that in games of perfect
information, robust knowledge of rationality yields backward induction. This may be
regarded as a natural form of Aumann’s theorem which accommodates belief revision.
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Introduction

Stalnaker’s approach to games of perfect information (PI games) introduces belief revision
into players’ reasoning [Stalnaker, 1998]. The paradigmatic example is provided by the
common interest game in Figure 1. In Aumann’s setting [Aumann, 1995], given common
knowledge of rationality, players play the backward induction solution (aaa), i.e., across
at all three nodes. Stalnaker’s approach claims that the solution (dda), i.e., down at v1 ,
down at v2 , and across at v3 can be regarded as rational under ‘the same’ assumption of
common knowledge of rationality, once belief revision is taken into account.
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Stalnaker’s reasoning proceeds as follows. Consider a variant of the game in which (dda)
is common knowledge. Then it is common knowledge that both players are rational, but
the only solution, (dda), is not the backward induction solution.
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Figure 1: Stalnaker’s game
It suffices to check that both players are rational in (dda); this would yield common
knowledge of rationality since (dda) is common knowledge.
• Ann is rational at v3 according to the game tree.
• Bob is rational at v2 since if Ann were to play across at v1 (an obviously irrational
move by Ann given her knowledge that Bob is playing down), then Bob revises his
initial belief of Ann’s rationality and no longer assumes that Ann will play across at
v3 . Under these circumstances, playing down at v2 is not irrational for Bob.
• Ann is rational at v1 since she knows that Bob is playing down.
In this proof, the heart of the matter is how Bob would react to being surprised by Ann’s
(irrational) move across at v1 . There are various possibilities:
1. Bob revises his belief in Ann’s rationality for the remainder of the game;
2. Bob does not revise his belief in Ann’s rationality for the remainder of the game.
Stalnaker describes what happens when the first possibility is allowed. This case was cast
in a formal logical framework in [Halpern, 2001].
We offer a general logical treatment of the second case and show that it leads to the
backward induction solution, BI, in all PI games.1 Our goal is not to defend or attack BI,
but to formulate the underlying issues fully and formally.
How does our approach correspond to Aumann’s? Aumann obtains BI, but not via
this route. In his treatment, there is no explicit belief revision and the condition “there
is no irrationality in the system” is represented by the common knowledge of rationality
1

[Stalnaker, 1998] claims that, in case 2, the game in Figure 1 will end in the backward induction
solution, but he does not offer a formal argument for this example or more generally.
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assumption. In contrast, we allow belief revision, but preserve knowledge of rationality
for the remainder of the game; the condition “there is no irrationality in the system” is
represented by a stronger assumption which we call robust knowledge of rationality. So
our approach may be regarded as an extension of Aumann’s to a belief revision setting.
In particular, when the belief revision is trivial, i.e., epistemic states do not change, our
approach coincides with Aumann’s.
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Models of rationality and belief revision

Let us recap basic terminology. An extensive game consists of the following components.
1. A finite set I = {1, 2, . . . , n} of players.
2. A finite rooted tree H with set of nodes (also called ‘vertices’) N . Each node has a
unique path from the root called the history of this node. The leaves of the game tree are
called terminal nodes, or outcomes. The set of all terminal nodes is called Z.
3. A player function P that assigns a player (making a move) to each nonterminal node.
4. For each player, a payoff function defined on Z.
The root node r is the starting point of the game. At any node v ∈ (N \ Z), player P (v)
chooses one of the successor nodes (makes a move).
An Aumann model is a tuple M = (Ω, K1 , . . . , Kn , s) where Ω is a set of “epistemic
states” of the world, K1 , . . . , Kn are knowledge partitions of Ω corresponding to players
1, 2, . . . , n, and s is a mapping from Ω to the set of all strategy profiles: for a state ω,
s(ω) = (s1 , . . . , sn ).
Each si is a strategy of player i, i.e., an assignment of a move at each node v such that
P (v) = i. We write si (ω) for i’s component of the strategy profile s(ω), i.e., si . Also, for
a strategy profile s, let (s−i , si ) be the strategy profile obtained from s by replacing si by
si , hvi (s) be i’s conditional payoff if strategy profile s is followed starting at v, and Ki (ω)
be the cell in Ki that includes ω. The following measurability property is usually assumed:
players know their own strategies, i.e., s(ω) = s(ω 0 ) whenever ω 0 ∈ Ki (ω).
The definition of rationality is formalized as follows.
Definition 1 Player i is rational at vertex v in state ω if, for each strategy si , there exists
ω 0 ∈ Ki (ω) such that
hvi (s(ω 0 )) ≥ hvi (s−i (ω 0 ), si ).
Extended models formalize Stalnaker’s representation of counterfactuals via the selection function “the closest world where a given vertex is reached.” In a formal setting,
the extended model is a tuple M = (Ω, K1 , . . . , Kn , s, f ) where (Ω, K1 , . . . , Kn , s) is an
Aumann model and a selection function f maps pairs of states and vertices to states. The
intended reading of f (ω, v) = ω 0 is ω 0 is the closest state to ω in which vertex v is reached.
It is assumed that f satisfies the following conditions:
3

F1. Vertex v is reached in f (ω, v).
F2. If v is reached in ω, then f (ω, v) = ω.
F3. s(f (ω, v)) and s(ω) agree on the subtree of the game tree at and below v.
Definition 2 Player i is Stalnaker-rational in state ω at vertex v if i is rational at v in
f (ω, v).
Substantive rationality is rationality at all vertices of the game tree. This definition also
extends to Stalnaker rationality.
In epistemology, ‘knowledge’ is usually understood as non-defeasible (cf. [Steup, 2005]),
and not subject to revision. Stalnaker allows revision of ‘common knowledge of rationality’ in some hypothetical situations and hence treats ‘common knowledge of rationality,’
rather, as ‘rationality and common belief of rationality.’ The latter has been formalized in the belief-based literature in various ways (cf. [Battigalli and Friedenberg, 2009,
Brandenburger and Friedenberg, 2010]); these also allow solution (dda) for the game in
Figure 1 under assumptions of rationality and common belief in rationality.
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Common knowledge is too weak for belief revision

We argue that the common knowledge of rationality assumption is too weak to guarantee
that there is no irrationality in the system. Consider the game in Figure 1. Following
[Halpern, 2001], we introduce2 the following strategy profiles:
• s1 is the strategy profile (dda), i.e., Ann plays down at v1 , Bob plays down at v2 , and
Ann plays across at v3 ;
• s2 is the strategy profile (ada);
• s3 is the strategy profile (add);
• s4 is the strategy profile (aaa) (which is the backward induction solution);
• s5 is the strategy profile (aad).
As in [Halpern, 2001], consider the extended model A = (Ω, KAnn , KBob , s, f ) where
• Ω = {ω1 , ω2 , ω3 , ω4 , ω5 };
• KAnn = {{ω1 }, {ω2 }, {ω3 }, {ω4 }, {ω5 }};
• KBob = {{ω1 }, {ω2 , ω3 }, {ω4 }, {ω5 }};
2

in slightly different notation

4

• s(ωj ) = sj for j =1–5;
• f (ω1 , v2 ) = ω2 , f (ω1 , v3 ) = ω4 , f (ω2 , v3 ) = ω4 , f (ω3 , v3 ) = ω5 , and f (ω, v) = ω in all
other situations.
The true epistemic state is assumed to be ω1 . The Stalnaker-Halpern argument claims that
Stalnaker rationality is common knowledge in ω1 .

(1)

Since ω1 is not a backward induction solution, (1) implies that in model A, common
knowledge of rationality does not yield backward induction. Let us prove (1). Since
KAnn (ω1 ) = KBob (ω1 ) = {ω1 },
everything that is true in ω1 is common knowledge in ω1 . Let us check that Stalnaker
rationality of both players holds in ω1 , in particular that Bob is Stalnaker-rational in ω1 at
v2 . Selection function f reduces this question to the claim that Bob is (Aumann-)rational
in state ω2 at vertex v2 which is established by direct application of Definition 1.
The problem is that in state ω2 at vertex v2 , Bob cannot know that Ann will stay
Stalnaker-rational. Indeed, Ann is not Stalnaker-rational in ω3 (since f (ω3 , v3 ) = ω5
and Ann is not rational in ω5 at v3 ), and ω3 ∈ KBob (ω2 ). Speaking informally, following
selection function f (ω1 , v2 ) = ω2 , Bob at v2 revises his belief from ω1 to ω2 in which Ann
plays across at v1 . Accidentally, Bob also forfeits his knowledge of Ann’s rationality at
v3 . Technically speaking, this is not a violation of the common knowledge of rationality
assumption since ω2 is not epistemically reachable from the original state ω1 ; this is the
essence of the Stalnaker example.
As we can see, the common knowledge of substantive Stalnaker rationality assumption
does not reach its intended goal to secure, in Aumann’s words ([Aumann, 2010]), that
“there is no irrationality in the system,” and hence stronger notions of shared rationality
should be considered.
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Robust knowledge

Robust knowledge is common knowledge that is maintained during belief revision.
Given an extended model M = (Ω, K1 , . . . , Kn , s, f ), a situation is a pair (ω, v) of a
state ω and nonterminal vertex v of the game tree. We define a notion of relevant situation
that reflects our goal to maintain common knowledge for the remainder of the game at any
depth of the belief revision process.
The set RS of situations relevant to a situation (ω, v) is the minimal set of situations
containing (ω, v) and closed under
a) reachability of states: (ω 0 , v 0 ) ∈ RS and ω 00 is reachable from ω 0 yields (ω 00 , v 0 ) ∈ RS
and
5

b) belief revision: (ω 0 , v 0 ) ∈ RS and v 0  v 003 yields (f (ω 0 , v 00 ), v 00 ) ∈ RS .
Definition 3 Event F is robust knowledge in situation (ω, v) if F holds in all situations
relevant to (ω, v).
We can say that F is robust knowledge in state ω if F is robust knowledge in situations
(ω, v) for all nonterminal vertices v. However, in the belief revision setting, it seems more
appropriate to consider knowledge/belief in situations rather than states since moving
from a node v to a later node v 0 can be accompanied by revision of epistemic states.
Definition 4 Event F is universal knowledge if F holds in all situations.
From the definitions, if follows that in any situation,
Universal Knowledge ⇒ Robust Knowledge ⇒ Common Knowledge ⇒ Knowledge.
If belief revision in a model is trivial, i.e., does not change epistemic states, f (ω, v) = ω
for each state ω and vertex v, then robust knowledge in the initial situation (ω, r), where
r is the root node of the game tree, is equivalent to common knowledge in state ω 4
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Robust knowledge of rationality

Robust knowledge of rationality means that rationality holds in all relevant situations. This
notion represents the belief revision strategy under which knowledge of rationality for the
remainder of the game is maintained.
Definition 5 Robust knowledge of rationality in a given situation means that, in each
relevant situation (ω, v), player P (v) is rational at vertex v in state ω.
Robust knowledge of rationality represents the condition that neither iterated reasoning
nor belief revision at any node can reach an ‘irrational’ situation.
How is this related to other methods of expressing “no irrationality in the system” in a
belief revision setting? It is immediately apparent that the common knowledge of substantive Stalnaker rationality is subsumed by robust knowledge of rationality. Indeed, suppose
common knowledge of substantive Stalnaker rationality does not hold in a true situation
(ω, v). Then there is a state ω 0 reachable from ω and node v 0  v such that rationality
of the corresponding player fails in situation (f (ω 0 , v 0 ), v 0 ). The latter is relevant in (ω, v),
hence robust knowledge of rationality fails in (ω, v). The fact that robust knowledge of
rationality is strictly stronger than common knowledge of substantive Stalnaker rationality
is demonstrated in Example 1.
i.e., v 00 is v 0 or a future node with respect to v 0 .
[Aumann, 1987] notes that in strategic games, one can restrict the universe to the smallest common
knowledge event, hence universal, robust, and common knowledge coincide.
3
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Example 1 In model A, there are five states and three non-terminal nodes, hence 5 × 3 =
15 situations total. Assuming common knowledge of substantive Stalnaker rationality in
true state ω1 means rationality in the following three situations:
S = {(ω1 , v1 ), (ω2 , v2 ), (ω4 , v3 )}.
However, as we have seen earlier, this assumption is not sufficient to ensure that there is
no irrationality in the system. In particular, in (ω2 , v2 ), Bob considers ω3 possible, and
to guarantee that Bob in (ω2 , v2 ) knows Ann’s rationality we have to add the condition
that Bob knows Ann’s rationality in (ω3 , v2 ) as well. Further closure with respect to
belief revision produces one more relevant situation (ω5 , v3 ) in which rationality should be
maintained to guarantee that “there is no irrationality in the system.”
We end up with the set W of all realizable situations relevant to true situation (ω1 , v1 ):
W = {(ω1 , v1 ), (ω2 , v2 ), (ω4 , v3 ), (ω3 , v2 ), (ω5 , v3 )}.
Robust knowledge of rationality does not hold in (ω1 , v1 ). Indeed, situation (ω5 , v3 ) is
relevant in (ω1 , v1 ), but Ann is not rational in ω5 at v3 .
This example illustrates the difference between Halpern-Stalnaker’s common knowledge
of substantive Stalnaker rationality and robust knowledge of rationality: the former is not
necessarily closed under reachability in relevant situations which allows for irrationality in
the system.
The following theorem states that robust knowledge of rationality yields backward induction in all PI games.
Theorem 1 In extended models over generic game trees, robust knowledge of rationality
yields backward induction.
Proof. Let M = (Ω, K1 , . . . , Kn , s, f ) be an extended model such that robust knowledge
of rationality holds in true situation (ω0 , r) where r is the root vertex. This means that a
corresponding player is rational in each relevant situation (ω, v). We claim that for every
relevant situation (ω, v), restriction of profile s(ω) on the subtree Γ below v (which includes
v itself) coincides with BI. Theorem 1 follows from this claim since (ω0 , r) is relevant in
itself and the subtree Γ below r is the entire game tree.
To prove the claim, assume the opposite, i.e., that s(ω) 6= BI on the subtree Γ below
v for some relevant situations (ω, v). Let (e
ω , ve) be such a situation with the lowest nonterminal vertex ve. Also, let i be the player making a move at ve.
Lemma 1 Let ω 0 ∈ Ki (e
ω ). Then s(ω 0 ) coincides with BI at any vertex v 0 strictly below ve.
Proof. Let v 0 be a vertex strictly below ve. Situation (f (ω 0 , v 0 ), v 0 ) is relevant, by the
definition. By the choice of ve, s(f (ω 0 , v 0 )) coincides with BI on v 0 . By condition F3 on the
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selection function, s(f (ω 0 , v 0 )) agrees with s(ω 0 ) on v 0 , hence s(ω 0 ) coincides with BI on v 0 . 2
In particular, s(e
ω ) coincides with BI at any vertex v 0 strictly below ve. By the choice of
(e
ω , ve), strategy profile s(e
ω ) suggests a non-BI move at or below ve. By Lemma 1, such a
move can only occur at ve. So, s(e
ω ) is different from BI at ve.
We now show that i is not rational in (e
ω , ve). Let ω 0 ∈ Ki (e
ω ), then situation (ω 0 , ve)
0
is relevant. By measurability, strategy profiles s(ω ) and s(e
ω ) coincide at ve, in particular,
0
s(ω ) differs from BI at ve.
Therefore, at and below ve, BI = (s−i (ω 0 ), BI i ). Since backward induction at ve chooses
the best move for i given BI-moves below ve, and the game tree is generic, the payoff of
s(ω 0 ) at ve is strictly worse than that of BI:
hvie(s(ω 0 )) < hvie(s−i (ω 0 ), BI i ).
By Definition 1, i is not rational in ω
e at ve, which contradicts the robust knowledge of
rationality assumption.
2
In addition, we can make an immediate existence observation: the epistemic conditions
of Theorem 1 are possible for any game tree.
Theorem 2 For an arbitrary game tree, there exists an extended Aumann model such that
robust knowledge of rationality holds in a true situation.5
Proof. Given a game tree T with set of nodes N and set of terminal nodes Z, define an
extended Aumann model M such that
Ω = {ωv | v ∈ N \ Z}, i.e., one state for each nonterminal node;
K1 = K2 = . . . = Kn = {{ωv } | v ∈ N \ Z};
s(ωv ) is a (unique) profile the leads from root r to v and coincides with the backward
induction profile BI at all other nodes;

ωu if v  u;
f (ωu , v) =
(2)
ωv otherwise.
It is easy to observe that properties F1–F3 of the selection function are valid.
In model M, the set RS of situations relevant to true situation (ωr , r) is
{(ωv , v) | v ∈ N \ Z}.
Indeed, since reachability in M is trivial, RS is generated by belief revision only: (ω 0 , v 0 ) ∈
RS and v 0  v 00 yields (f (ω 0 , v 00 ), v 00 ) ∈ RS . Belief revision always applies selection function
f to a future node, hence only the second clause of the definition of f (2) is applicable:
since u ≺ v, (f (ωu , v), v) = (ωv , v).
In each situation (ωv , v), player P (v) is rational since profile s(ωv ) coincides with BI at
and below v, and BI suggests the best response for P (v) at v.
2
5

Theorem 2 and its proof were added on May 30, 2011.
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Discussion

1. Coherence of knowledge and revision. It makes sense to consider some additional
properties of extended Aumann models. For example, it seems natural to assume that if a
vertex is reached, all players know this, i.e., if v is reached in some state in Ki (ω), then v
is reached in all states in Ki (ω). This property is met in the Stalnaker example, model A.
2. Error tolerance levels. For games with a ‘small’ number of irrational moves, robust
knowledge of rationality can be justified by a strong reputation for the rationality of players,
their history of rational behavior, etc. An isolated irrational move can be viewed as a
technical error. However, trust in rationality can fade with each irrational move and given
a ‘large’ number of such moves, robust knowledge of rationality could become unfeasible.
More realistic models of robust rationality could include an error-tolerance level, i.e., a
bound on the number of errors (e.g., one) allowed for each player.

7

Acknowledgments

The author is greatly indebted to Robert Aumann for his interest and encouraging support
of this work. The author is deeply grateful to Adam Brandenburger for his guidance
and inspiring discussions. This paper substantially benefited from insightful comments by
Christian Bach. Many thanks also to Vladimir Krupski, Elena Nogina, and Çağıl Taşdemir
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